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Bank Directors Beware: Post-Crisis Bank Director 
Liability 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The average corporation in twenty-first century America is 
becoming startlingly similar to an eighteenth century European pirate 
crew. Described by one historian as “sea-going stock compan[ies],” 
pirate ships featured elected captains and officers.1 Despite pop-culture 
depictions of pirate captains as tyrannical, monstrous figures with hook 
hands and a suspiciously large cut of the plundered booty, these  
captains and officers in fact often served entirely at the pleasure of their 
pirate crews.2 The pirate captains were often held liable and penalized 
for poor judgment, behavior that the crew felt did not serve its interests, 
or, in Captain Charles Vane’s case, plain old-fashioned cowardice.3 
Today, corporations, including banks, are becoming much more 
like these pirates’ sea-going stock companies by increasingly holding 
members of their boards of directors personally liable.4 Although  
holding bank directors liable for decisions made in their official  
capacity does not result in the same penalties that pirate captains 
received, the punishment of personal liability has  been  increasingly 
used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in the past 
few decades and since the 2008 financial crisis in particular.5 
This Note examines the most recent wave of personal liability 
for bank directors regarding decisions made in their official capacity, as 
well as the implications that this trend may have on bank directors and 
shareholders. Part II discusses FDIC claims against bank directors, 
including the FDIC claim process, the applicable law, and the standard 
 
1. Peter T. Leeson, An-aargh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 
115 U. CHI. J. POL. ECON. 1049, 1064–67 (2007). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS 1 (2014) (stating 
that between January 1, 2009, and December 19, 2014, the FDIC has authorized suits 
“against 1181 individuals for D&O liability,” including “104 filed D&O lawsuits . . .  
naming 793 former directors and officers”). 
5. Id. 
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of care in director liability cases.6 Part III details the trend prior to the 
2008 financial crisis in bank director personal liability in enforcement 
actions.7 Part IV examines the post-2008 financial crisis trend in bank 
director personal liability in enforcement actions and details the 
characteristics of many post-crisis claims.8 Part V discusses methods  
that banks use to protect their directors from personal liability, including 
indemnification agreements and director and officer liability insurance 
policies (“D&O insurance”).9 Part VI addresses the potential effects of 
holding directors personally liable, both from the directors’ and 
shareholders’ perspectives.10 Finally, Part VII concludes by considering 
the overall impact of director personal liability and discussing a 
potential alternative to holding directors personally liable.11 
II. FDIC CLAIMS AGAINST BANK DIRECTORS 
 
When a federally insured bank fails, the FDIC is appointed as 
receiver by the bank’s regulator, which is determined by the bank’s 
charter.12 The FDIC also covers the losses resulting from the bank’s 
collapse in order to limit risks to the deposit insurance fund and the 
effect of the bank’s failure on the financial system.13 As receiver, the 
FDIC conducts investigations into the bank’s failure and, if necessary 
and prudent, brings professional liability suits against the failed bank’s 
former directors and officers on behalf of the bank itself.14 The FDIC 
can hold directors personally liable for gross negligence or conduct that 
exceeds gross negligence,15 and therefore, a bank director is required to 
act   as   a   “prudent   and   diligent   business   person.”16   While   gross 
 
 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. See infra Part IV. 
9. See infra Part V. 
10. See infra Part VI. 
11. See infra Part VII. 
12. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, ch. 7 (2003). 
13. Id. 
14. ANJALI C. DAS, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, CLIENT 
ALERT: NEW FDIC LAWSUITS ATTACK FORMER BANK D&OS 2 (May 2011), available at 
http://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Legal_Analysis/ins_fdic_may11.pdf. 
15. Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (West 2013). 
16. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-87-92, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BANK DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1992), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3300.html. 
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negligence is the stated standard of care, in practice, many FDIC 
professional liability suits bring claims under a lower standard of simple 
negligence.17 The most common claims brought by the FDIC against 
directors of failed banks allege the following: “(i) dishonest conduct or 
abusive insider transactions; (ii) violations of internal policies, law, or 
regulations that resulted in a safety or soundness violation; or  (iii) 
failure to establish, monitor, or follow proper underwriting procedures, 
or heed warnings from regulators or advisors.”18 
 
A. The FDIC Claim Process 
 
The first step in the FDIC receivership process is for the bank’s 
chartering authority to close the bank and to name the FDIC as the 
receiver.19 The appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a bank is not 
mandatory, but may occur for a number of reasons, including a bank’s 
maintenance of insufficient assets for obligations or 
undercapitalization.20 After the FDIC is named as the  receiver, the  
FDIC leads an investigation into the financial institution.21 If this 
investigation uncovers material that warrants an FDIC claim and any 
attempted settlements between the FDIC and the director fail, the 
potential claim goes to the FDIC’s Board of Directors (“FDIC Board”) 
for consideration.22 If the FDIC Board decides to pursue action against 
the director or the financial institution, the FDIC will file a claim in 
federal court.23 
Before filing the claim in court, the FDIC must first consider 
two questions in order to justify the suit: (1) whether success on the 
claim is more likely than not, and (2) whether pursuing the claim will be 
 
17. AABD Survey Result on Measuring Bank Director Fear of Personal Liability Are 
Not Good News, AM. ASS’N OF BANK DIRECTORS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://aabd.org/aabd- 
survey-results-measuring-bank-director-fear-personal-liability-good-news/. 
18. Mary C. Gill et al., Claims Against Bank Directors and Officers Arising From the 
Financial Crisis, 26 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 69, 70 (2010). 
19. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(5), (2)(A)(ii); DONNA L. WILSON & KRISTOPHER KNABE, 
BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, FDIC BANK FAILURE LITIGATION: UNDERSTANDING AND 
NAVIGATING THE FDIC’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND MORTGAGE FRAUD SUITS 3–4 (Apr. 
18, 2012). 
20. WILSON & KNABE, supra note 19 (citing 12 U.S.C.A. §1821(c)(5)). 
21. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 16, at 2 (referencing FDIA § 884, 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1821). 
22. Id. at 2. 
23. Id. 
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cost effective.24 In assessing the likelihood of success, the FDIC 
conducts a thorough interview of the factual circumstances surrounding 
the claim.25 In assessing whether pursuing the claim is likely to be cost 
effective, the FDIC investigates potential recovery award assets, such as 
the bank’s D&O insurance coverage and the director’s personal assets.26 
The FDIC only pursues claims where the recovery is expected to justify 
the costs of investigation and litigation.27 Therefore, D&O insurance is 
an important consideration since directors often do not have sufficient 
personal assets to cover FDIC claims.28 
 
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Care 
 
Before the savings and loan crisis (“S&L crisis”) in the mid- 
1980s, the spotlight on bank and S&L directors’ activities was not as 
blinding as it is today.29 After many  depository  institutions  failed 
during the S&L crisis, consumers and the market looked for answers 
and the FDIC focused more on directors.30 To protect directors and 
officers from this new scrutiny, states passed statutes that raised the 
standard of care to gross negligence for bank director and officer 
personal liability.31 Statutes like these, referred to as “insulating 
statutes,” offer directors extra coverage by requiring that parties, 
including the FDIC, bringing action against them, prove a “disregard for 
a director’s duties or an extreme deviation from expected behavior,” as 
opposed to the previous, lower standard of ordinary negligence.32 
 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. DAS, supra note 14, at 2. 
27. THOMAS P. VARTANIAN & ROBERT H. LEDIG, DECHERT LLP, BANK D&O DEFENSE 
MANUAL 6 (May 2012), available at http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/7f7fad0c- 
600b-4f85-8cab-461dc3e08b49/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0f32f58c-b774-4c95- 
9c37-118103b6d303/Bank%20DO%20Defense%20Manual_May2012.pdf. 
28. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 
271 (1998). 
29. See generally Ronald W. Stevens, FDIC Lawsuits Against Former Directors and 
Officers of Banks That Have Failed Since 2008: Is This Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 97 
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 762 (Nov. 1, 2011). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Benjamin Saul, Know the Standard of FDIC Liability for Community Banks 
Portfolio Media Inc., LAW360 (Feb. 5, 2013, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/411958/know-the-standard-of-fdic-liability-for- 
community-banks. 
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Delaware statutes demonstrate this protective approach, 
imposing only two basic fiduciary duties on directors and officers: the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.33 The duty of care requires that 
directors execute their duties in good faith, with the same level of care 
that an ordinarily prudent director would use,34 and “in a manner [the 
director] believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”35 
Similarly, the duty of loyalty requires directors to act on behalf of the 
corporation,36 and refrain from “self-dealing, usurpation of corporate 
opportunity, and any acts that would permit them to receive an improper 
personal benefit or injure their constituencies.”37 
In 1989, Congress responded to these insulating statutes by 
passing the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement 
Act (“FIRREA”).38 Included in FIRREA was the authorization for the 
FDIC to hold directors personally liable for gross  negligence.39  
FIRREA preempts the insulating statutes in FDIC claims on behalf of 
state-chartered banks.40 While there was disagreement over whether 
FIRREA’s new standard also applied to federally-chartered banks,41 the 
Supreme Court ultimately resolved this disagreement in 1997, holding 
that state law dictates the applicable  standard.42  Therefore,  FIRREA 
can only impose a lower bar for personal liability suits in FDIC claims 
on behalf of state-chartered banks.43 As a result, the FDIC is permitted  
to pursue claims against directors of federally chartered banks even 
under simple negligence if state law allows it.44 
While directors may face liability under either state law or the 
 
33.    Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367–68 (Del. 1993). 
34. Id. 
35. Stevens, supra note 29 (quoting Calif. Corp. Code § 309(a)). 
36.    Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
37. LATHAM & WATKINS, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND POTENTIAL LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS 
AND OFFICERS OF FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS 2 (June 2003), available at 
http://iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/393/1422.html. 
38. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 
U.S.C.); VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27, at 5. 
39. VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27, at 5 (referencing Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act (FDIA) § 884(k), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (West 2013). 
40. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992), en 
banc, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 993 (1992). 
41. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 275. 
42. Atherton v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 227–28 (1997). 
43. See Atherton v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 227–28 (1997). 
44. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS, supra note 4. 
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FIRREA standard, the common law business judgment rule45 helps 
protect directors of both state and federally chartered banks who face 
FDIC claims.46 The business judgment rule provides a presumption that 
absent any self-interest, directors making a business decision are acting 
in good faith and with due care.47 The rule has often been used to shield 
directors against FDIC claims of negligence or breach of fiduciary 
duty.48 Because it bestows a strong presumption of good faith and due 
care upon directors, even director decisions that have proven disastrous 
can be protected if the director reasonably believed it was in the 
corporation’s best interest at the time.49 
In FDIC as Receiver for Cooperative Bank v. Willetts,50 for 
example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina held that the business judgment rule completely 
protected a group of bank directors and officers that had been sued by 
the FDIC.51 In 2006, Cooperative Bank (“Cooperative”), based in 
Wilmington, North Carolina, earned a CAMELS “2” rating, which 
indicates a fundamentally sound firm with only moderate weaknesses.52 
Cooperative was downgraded to a CAMELS “5” rating in 2008 and was 
closed in 2009.53  After coming under FDIC receivership, the FDIC   
sued nine of Cooperative’s directors and officers, alleging negligence, 
gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty regarding imprudent 
lending practices.54 Stating that the business judgment rule defeated the 
FDIC’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims and that there 
was  “no  gross  negligence  on the part  of Cooperative’s  directors  and 
 
45. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: 
RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES § 2:12 (2014). 
46. VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27. 
47. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 45. 
48. VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27, at 8. 
49. Id. 
50. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Willets, No. 7:11-cv-00165-BO (E.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 
2014), ECF No. 124; see also CAMDEN R. WEBB & KACEY L. HUNT, WILLIAMS MULLEN, 
CLIENT ALERT: FDIC V. WILLETS (Nov. 10, 2014). 
51. WEBB & HUNT, supra note 50, at 5. 
52. Id. at 2. Banks receive composite ratings known as “CAMELS,” based on six 
factors: (1) capital adequacy; (2) asset quality; (3) management; (4) earnings; (5) liquidity; 
and (6) sensitivity to market risk. CAMELS ratings range from one, which represents “the 
strongest performance and risk management practices” to five, which signals a high level of 
concern regarding management practices and performance. COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS 9 (2007). 
53. WEBB & HUNT, supra note 50, at 5. 
54. Id. at 3. 
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officers,” the court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the 
directors and officers.55 The combination of the business judgment rule 
and adherence to Cooperative’s internal lending policies by directors 
and officers combined to create a strong presumption of innocence for 
the directors and officers.56 Cooperative’s case signals the strong level  
of protection the business judgment rule can provide directors in an 
otherwise unforgiving post-crisis personal liability landscape.57 
III. PRE-CRISIS TREND IN REGULATION 
 
Before the 1980s, bank director liability suits were not so 
common.58 In fact, the FDIC initially had no receivership staff  
dedicated to professional liability issues.59 Following the S&L crisis, 
however, FDIC and Resolution Trust Corporation60 lawsuits against 
directors and officers increased.61 Between the early 1980s and the mid-
1990s, the FDIC filed more than 800 professional liability lawsuits after 
more than 1,600 FDIC-insured depository institutions failed.62 
Ultimately, between 1986 and 1996, the FDIC and RTC collected more 
than $5 billion, with $1.3 billion of that total coming from  claims 
against directors and officers.63 As a result of this increase in 
professional liability suits, the FDIC created a full-time  receivership 
staff dedicated entirely to professional liability issues.64 
Despite a late-1990s lull, the early 2000s brought an increase in 
the number of professional liability suits once again, this time as a result 
 
 
55. Id. at 5. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 268. 
59. Id. 
60. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
established the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) with the objectives of managing and 
resolving cases related to depository institutions and maximizing the value generated from 
the liquidation of depository institutions. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501(a), 103 Stat. 183, 363. The 
RTC was abolished in 1991, Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and 
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 310, 105 Stat. 1761, 1769, and it’s 
corporate functions were terminated pursuant to the Resolution Trust Corporation 
Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-204, 107 Stat. 2369, 2369 (1993). 
61. See generally Stevens, supra note 29. 
62. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 270. 
63.    Id. at 285. 
64.    Id. at 268. 
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of accounting fraud scandals.65 In the early 2000s, corporations and 
banks like Enron and Superior Bank, as well as their auditing firms such 
as Arthur Andersen and Ernst & Young, were accused of accounting 
fraud.66 For example, after Superior Bank was closed and put into 
receivership by the FDIC in 2001, the Office of Thrift Supervision cited 
improper accounting, poor lending practices, and ineffective 
management supervision as contributing factors in the bank’s failure.67 
The FDIC brought suit against Superior Bank’s accounting firm, Ernst 
& Young, for $2 billion.68 Fearing a lawsuit against themselves as well, 
the bank’s owners, the Pritzker family, settled with the FDIC for an 
immediate payment of $100 million and an additional $360 million over 
the subsequent fifteen years.69 Accounting fraud scandals like this 
sparked an increase in professional liability suits in the early 2000s and 
renewed the fear of director liability.70 
IV. CURRENT TREND IN REGULATIONS AND COMMON CHARACTERISTICS 
OF RECENT FDIC CLAIMS 
 
By 2007, some suggested that the increased-liability wave that 
began after the accounting scandals of the early 2000s was fading away 
and an era of decreased personal liability for directors was finally 
returning.71 The increased-liability atmosphere returned once again, 
however, at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis,72 with a spike in 
the number of FDIC professional liability lawsuits following a surge in 
bank failures.73    In total, the FDIC has named 749 directors and officers 
 
 
65.    Id. at 271. 
66. John McCormick, Pritzker’s Superior Bank Subprime Losses Blemish Resume, 
BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-22/pritzker-s- 
superior-bank-subprime-losses-blemish-resume.html. 
67. Id. 
68. David Moberg, Breaking the Bank, IN THESE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2002), 
http://inthesetimes.com/issue/27/01/feature2.shtml. 
69. Id. 
70. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 271. 
71. Delaware Courts Again Are Safe Haven for D&Os, ACE GROUP (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.acegroup.com/bm-en/media-centre/delaware-courts-again-are-safe-haven-for- 
dos.aspx. 
72. Thomas P. Vartanian et al., Enforcement Actions Continue Three-Year Decline; 
DOJ Emerges as Major Player, 102 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 947, 947–953 (May 20, 
2014). 
73. Id. 
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in ninety-seven lawsuits since 2009.74 The aggregate settlements 
obtained not only from lawsuits pursued by the FDIC and RTC, but also 
from claims against directors and officers that did not result in a filed 
complaint, is approximately $330 million.75 
FDIC professional liability claims against former directors of 
failed banks since the 2008 financial crisis share common 
characteristics, including the named defendants, damages sought, and 
the amount that directors have paid out-of-pocket from judgments and 
settlements.76 Although the number of bank failures per year has 
decreased since 2010, the number of professional liability suits against 
directors and officers peaked in 2013 at fifty-three.77 This is likely due  
to the FDIC’s statute of limitations on professional liability claims— 
three years for tort claims and six years for contract claims—which can 
be extended if state law permits a longer period of time.78 
While a statute of limitations could hamper FDIC professional 
liability claims in some circumstances, the FDIC has an additional tool: 
“tolling agreements.”79 Tolling agreements provide the FDIC an 
additional year after the expiration of the statute of limitations to 
determine whether it will file a lawsuit following a bank’s failure.80 
Tolling agreements are often agreed to by potential defendants in order 
to allow more time for the parties to reach a pre-litigation  settlement 
and avoid trial altogether.81 As a result, these agreements are a valuable 
option for the FDIC because of the lengthy and costly nature of 
litigation.82 The FDIC’s authority to extend the statute of limitations 
arises out of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which allows the  FDIC 
 
 
74. WEBB & HUNT, supra note 50. 
75. ABE CHERNIN ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, CHARACTERISTICS OF FDIC 
LAWSUITS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (2013). 
76. See generally id. 
77. Vartanian et al., supra note 72, at 6. 
78. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS, supra note 4, at 1; VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra 
note 27, at 8. 
79. Emily Atkin, FDIC Amping Up Suits Against Failed Bank Execs, LAW360 (Sept. 
16, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/473008/fdic-amping-up-suits-against- 
failed-bank-execs. 
80. Id. 
81. OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-CA-14-012, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST INSTITUTION-AFFILIATED PARTIES AND 
INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH FAILED INSTITUTIONS 30 (July 2014). 
82. Susan N.K. Gummow, Back to the Future: FDIC Litigation Has Returned, 
RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 1, 26 (2011). 
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to both extend running statutes of limitation as well as “revive an 
expired statute of limitations in select cases, including claims involving 
alleged fraud or intentional misconduct.”83 
While professional liability claims since the 2008 financial  
crisis have been as high as $600 million each, the majority of these 
claims have been for amounts less than $20 million.84 These claims are 
pursued in part to recoup any losses incurred by the FDIC deposit 
insurance fund when it stepped in to cover a failed bank’s obligations.85 
In aggregate, between 2007 and 2013, 471 bank failures in the United 
States have resulted in a $92.5 billion hit to the FDIC’s deposit 
insurance fund.86 In order to mitigate these losses, the FDIC prefers to 
reach settlements with banks and their directors, rather than pursue 
litigation against them.87 
While the FDIC’s preference for settlement may save litigation 
costs, the secrecy surrounding these post-financial crisis settlements has 
received some criticism.88 In what the Los Angeles Times described as 
“a major policy shift from previous crises, when the FDIC trumpeted 
punitive actions against banks as a deterrent to others,” FDIC settlement 
agreements have begun to include “no press release” clauses.89 These 
clauses promise that the FDIC will not engage in publicity regarding the 
settlement terms.90 Although the FDIC cannot legally keep details of its 
settlement amounts secret, these clauses allow directors to minimize 
damages and avoid admitting wrongdoing.91 The “no press release” 
clauses also mean that the settlements are not “trumpeted” as they were 
following the S&L crisis.92 Consequently, these settlements do not 
provide   the   deterrent   force   that   may   result   from   a   publicized 
 
 
83. Joshua Glazov, When the FDIC Takes over a Failed Bank: Business Pitfalls and 
Opportunities, MUCH SHELIST (May 12, 2010), http://www.muchshelist.com/knowledge- 
center/article/business-pitfalls-and-opportunities-when-the-fdic-takes-over-a-failed-bank. 
84. CHERNIN ET AL., supra note 75, at 10. 
85. E. Scott Reckard, In Major Policy Shift, Scores of FDIC Settlements Go 
Unannounced, L.A.TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/11/business/la-fi-fdic-settlements-20130311. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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settlement.93 
Although personal contributions by directors in  these 
settlements are often negotiated away or covered by D&O insurance 
policies,94 there is still a risk that directors may have to pay out-of- 
pocket.95 Of the forty-four agreements involving directors and officers 
filed between January 2008 and April 2013, 39% required payments by 
directors and officers out of pocket, for an aggregate of $8 million.96 
These personal contributions were often in addition to payments made 
by insurance providers,97 as in the case of IndyMac and Washington 
Mutual.98 One former IndyMac CEO’s recent settlement with the FDIC 
was reportedly $12 million, with $1 million of that amount designated  
to come from the officer’s personal funds, and the remaining $11 
million to be covered by D&O insurance.99 In another settlement 
reached between the FDIC and three Washington Mutual officers, the 
officers were required to pay out-of-pocket a combined $400,000 of the 
total $64 million settlement agreement.100 Although these examples 
detail settlements regarding officers, directors have experienced similar 
settlements.101 In a 2012 settlement with the FDIC, Downey Financial 
Corporation’s former board chairman and co-founder, Maurice 
McAlister, agreed to pay $1.93 million out-of-pocket, with other 
Downey insiders agreeing to pay an additional combined $1.75 
million.102   The bank’s insurer paid an additional $28.4 million.103 
 
93. Id. 
94. JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, DIRECTOR AND OFFICER 
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE—ISSUES FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES TO CONSIDER 3 (2013). 
95. Chris Cumming, Liability Concerns Impede Director Recruitment at Banks, AM. 
BANKER (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_75/liability- 
concerns-impede-director-recruitment-at-banks-1066974-1.html. 
96. CHERNIN ET AL., supra note 75, at 2. 
97. Id. at 11. 
98. Paul Shukovsky, FDIC Settles with Former WaMu Executives for $64 Million; 
Personal Loss Said Minimal, 97 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1042, 1042 (Dec. 14, 
2011). 
99. VORYS, CLIENT ALERT: PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE FDIC; THE INDYMAC 
DECISION (Jan. 2, 2013). 
100. Louise Story, Ex-Bank Executives Settle F.D.I.C. Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2011, at B5. 
101. William K. Black, Which Aspect of the FDIC’s Litigation Failures is the Most 
Embarrassing and Damaging, NEW ECON. PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 12, 2013), 
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V. BANKS’ INSULATION OF DIRECTORS FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY 
 
The first line of defense available to directors is an 
indemnification agreement, with D&O insurance serving as the second 
line of defense.104 Most banks elect to use both an indemnification 
agreement and D&O insurance policy to insulate directors  from 
personal liability.105  As a prerequisite to accepting a director position at 
a bank, many directors seek assurance that their personal assets are 
protected by not only the promise of indemnification from the 
corporation but also a D&O insurance policy from an external insurance 
company.106 The two forms of coverage are typically designed to work  
in conjunction, with the standard D&O policy presuming that the bank 
will first provide a director the maximum amount of indemnification 
legally allowed by the law of the bank’s state of incorporation, and with 
the D&O policy supplementing any claim that the director is not 
indemnified against.107 The combination of these two mechanisms 
provide directors with broad and thorough coverage against personal 
liability because the D&O policy will fill any gaps in the 
indemnification policy’s first line of defense.108 
 
A. Indemnification Agreements 
 
Indemnification agreements function separately from the typical 
indemnification provision contained in a bank’s bylaws.109 
Indemnification agreements create a stronger contractual obligation 
between the director and the bank so that the bank will indemnify a 
director “whose conduct meets the applicable standard” and advance 
expenses to the director for her defense against professional liability 
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claims.110 While a bank may promise in its organizational documents to 
provide directors the maximum indemnification allowed under  state 
law, in extreme circumstances, these bylaws may be amended by 
shareholder approval, thus potentially amending the indemnification 
provided within them.111 This risk may be particularly high when the 
indemnified director no longer sits on the board.112 By having  a  
separate indemnification agreement, both current and former  directors 
do not have to worry that the indemnification contained in the bylaws 
may be pulled out from underneath them.113 
Indemnification agreements also clarify how indemnification 
provisions included in state law function in the real world.114 State law 
generally provides corporations broad license to indemnify directors.115 
For example, Delaware general corporation law permits director 
indemnification subject to two basic conditions: (1) good faith; and (2) 
reasonable belief by the director that the conduct was lawful and in the 
corporation’s best interests.116 However, case law regarding dispute 
resolution in the event of an indemnification dispute and whether 
corporations are required to purchase D&O insurance is underdeveloped 
in states other than Delaware.117 Therefore, a separate indemnification 
agreement can clarify details should the company have to indemnify the 
director.118 
 
B. D&O Insurance Policies 
 
D&O insurance was first introduced in the 1930s when state law 
did not permit corporations to indemnify their directors or officers; 
however, it did not initially take off because corporations did not see 
D&O personal liability as a significant risk.119   While state legislatures 
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began permitting corporate indemnification in the 1940s and 1950s,120 
D&O personal liability protection—both indemnification agreements 
and insurance policies—did not become common until the 1960s.121 
Two 1968 decisions122 held directors and officers personally liable 
despite not having profited personally from their behavior, ushering in a 
new world of director and officer liability.123 D&O insurance policies 
became more popular124 as corporations were forced to recognize the 
exposure that their directors and officers faced.125 The percentage of 
major corporations carrying D&O insurance grew from approximately 
10% in the early 1960s to 70–80% in 1971.126 Today, almost all 
corporations, including banks, carry D&O insurance policies as 
additional protection for their directors and officers.127 
Corporations purchase D&O insurance policies to protect 
directors and officers from personal liability arising from conduct 
executed in their official capacity.128 Policies not only protect the 
directors and officers, but also the corporation itself, as these policies 
cover claims that the company might otherwise have to pay on behalf of 
its executives.129 
D&O insurance policies may contain three “sides,” or types, of 
coverage.130 The traditional policy, however, is only composed of two 
sides: Side A and Side B coverage.131 Side A coverage (the only type 
that applies to directors and officers) protects directors and officers 
against  claims  that  the  corporation  is  legally  prohibited  against  or 
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feasibly incapable of indemnifying the director or officer.132 Because it 
reaches non-indemnifiable claims and goes beyond the traditional D&O 
coverage, Side A coverage is known as  “Broad  Form”  coverage.133 
Side A coverage also fills any gaps in indemnification created by state 
carve-out statutory exceptions, which explicitly prohibit indemnification 
in some circumstances.134 
Side B coverage is also included in typical D&O insurance 
policies.135 Rather than offering protection for the bank’s officers and 
directors, however, Side B coverage protects the bank’s finances.136  
Side B coverage reimburses the corporation for its losses in the event 
that the corporation has to indemnify a director or officer for claims 
brought against her.137 Yet it does not offer the corporation protection 
for claims brought against the corporation itself.138 Side C coverage  
does provide protection for claims brought by the bank against itself and 
is therefore often added to the traditional coverage.139 
 
C. Weaknesses in D&O Insurance Policies 
 
While D&O insurance policies provide many benefits for 
directors, they also contain some weaknesses, which have worsened 
since the 2008 financial crisis.140 First, the interaction between the three 
types of coverage can create financial risk for bank executives.141 Most 
claims paid out under D&O insurance policies are under Side B or C 
coverage, leaving the policy limit depleted, and directors at risk.142 
Secondly,  D&O  insurance  policies  can  be  frozen  during  a  bank’s 
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receivership because they are technically assets of the bank.143 In these 
situations, the once fully insured director is left to fend for herself.144 
Although “order of payment” provisions, which prioritize directors and 
officers over the corporation in terms of policy payouts, are often 
included in insurance policies, some question their effectiveness 
because the provision often applies only if the payments to the director 
and corporation are simultaneous.145 
Moreover, policy exclusions may leave directors without 
protection.146 Although D&O policies typically cover losses arising out 
of compensatory damages, settlement amounts, and legal fees,147 this 
coverage  is typically limited by three  significant exclusions: (1)  fraud; 
(2) prior claims; and (3) insured versus insured.148 First, the “fraud” 
exclusion applies to claims alleging actual fraud or personal enrichment 
by the director.149 The second exclusion, for “prior claims,” bars 
protection against claims “either noticed or pending prior to the 
commencement of the policy period.”150 Finally, the “insured versus 
insured” exclusion states that insurers do not have to pay damages when 
two people covered by the same policy sue each other.151 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, changes in D&O insurance 
policies have resulted in even less director coverage.152 Many D&O 
insurance companies have experienced a decline in profit since the 2008 
financial crisis due to the cost of defending against and settling 
claims.153 As a result, these companies have now adopted stricter 
acceptance criteria, making D&O insurance policies harder to 
acquire.154 The cost of D&O insurance coverage also increased 
immediately following the crisis, though there is some suggestion that 
this spike in coverage costs has now leveled off.155     D&O insurance 
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companies have also increased the exclusionary terms in D&O 
policies.156 
For example, the “insured versus insured” exclusion has been 
widened to prohibit coverage of directors and officers who face FDIC 
professional liability suits.157 In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia held that the exclusion prohibits carriers 
from covering officers and directors sued by the FDIC as well.158 For a 
bank with a traditional D&O insurance policy that covers both directors 
and the bank itself, an FDIC-as-receiver suit against the bank’s directors 
is ultimately an “insured versus insured” suit because the FDIC is acting 
as the bank.159 This creates a gaping hole in policy coverage for the 
average bank, as D&O insurance policies are now prohibited from 
covering directors and officers sued by the FDIC.160 
VI. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF INCREASED BANK DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
For  shareholders,  there  are  significant  advantages  of holding 
bank   directors   personally   liable   for   their   decisions.161   First   and 
foremost, potential personal liability may further incentivize directors to 
prioritize compliance with federal regulations.162 Banks have responded 
to stronger regulatory enforcement with enhanced compliance programs 
and an increased focus on risk exposure.163 Additionally, increased risk 
of personal liability creates an incentive for banks and their directors to 
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improve their corporate governance policies.164 Corporations with 
histories of poor corporate governance are often forced to pay higher 
D&O insurance premiums because of the increased risk of coverage.165 
Directors are negatively affected by the increased risk of 
personal financial liability.166  After the 2008 financial crisis, “[i]t is  
now a much more serious responsibility to take on the role of director 
for any regulated entity”167 because a director of a financial entity “is 
placing him or herself in the frame for very focused attention by 
regulators.”168 
Additional, though indirect, negative implications of personal 
liability for directors are the circular process of heightened liability, 
more extensive D&O insurance policies, and the FDIC’s decision to 
bring suit where there are reachable D&O insurance policies.169 In a 
situation in which the FDIC has been appointed as receiver of a bank, 
the FDIC’s analysis of whether or not to pursue a claim takes into 
account   potential   recovery.170 Therefore,   a   heightened-liability 
atmosphere that leads banks to arm themselves with extensive D&O 
insurance policies could actually make the FDIC more likely to pursue a 
claim against a director because of the increased potential recovery.171 
The increased risk of personal liability may also make it  
difficult for companies to recruit qualified directors.172 A recent survey 
of 2,000 banks and savings institutions stated that in the past five years, 
24.5% of respondents said that they had a director resign or refuse to 
serve on the board itself or on the board’s bank loan committee due to 
fear of personal liability.173 This fear is exacerbated by a lack of 
information  and  transparency  concerning  the  source  of  payment   in 
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FDIC settlements, as directors do not know the percentage paid by  
D&O insurance policies in comparison to director personal 
contributions.174 Adding to the uncertainty and distress is the damage to 
a director’s reputation, career, and future earnings, all of which are not 
compensable by insurance.175 The increased number of FDIC 
professional liability suits along with the uncertainty of actual director 
out-of-pocket expenses have combined to make “bank directors and 
prospects . . . more concerned than ever about the extent of D&O 
coverage,”176 and have made it increasingly difficult for banks to recruit 
and keep highly qualified directors.177 
Also of concern is the potential for less innovation and positive 
development within banks as directors focus more on self-preservation 
and less on good, but potentially risky, business decisions.178 In a 
business environment which often reveres a daring and inventive 
approach to firm strategy and development, the mentality of an under- 
protected director is at odds with the bold approach demanded by the 
market and shareholders.179 As innovation often comes with a higher 
degree of risk than more traditional and conservative approaches, 
directors whose personal finances are at stake may be less willing to 
make innovative choices,180 and the long-term health and success of the 
bank could be negatively effected as a result.181 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
While U.S. consumers and regulators have been calling for 
heightened personal liability since the 2008 financial crisis, it is clear 
that the overall effects of increased personal liability are negative. To 
address the disparity among these desires and the practical effects, the 
industry should implement a system that has the same effect of director 
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personal liability from consumer and regulator standpoints while still 
offering directors some protection. This system should involve an 
increase in accountability and transparency at the executive level 
through strengthening corporate governance practices and publicizing 
re-designed corporate governance indices.182 
Improving corporate governance systems within financial 
institutions is a key component of increasing accountability and 
promoting cultures that emphasize responsible practices.183 Efforts by 
financial institutions in this area so far have included elevating risk- 
management priorities by adding or promoting Chief Risk Officers and 
establishing a risk committee within the board.184 In a recent survey of 
major financial institutions, Ernst & Young found that 34% of 
respondents have added board members with risk expertise.185 Other 
proposed changes include separating the management and control 
functions of banks and promoting long-term orientation of executive 
compensation and decision-making in order to align directors’ personal 
interests with those of the financial institution.186 
In addition to improving corporate governance systems within 
banks, the industry should redesign the corporate governance reports 
used to evaluate these systems.187 Current corporate governance indices 
use measurements such as shareholder rights and board entrenchment as 
an indication of a corporation’s corporate environment,188 but more 
thorough and routinely executed assessments by external parties could 
provide more accurate insight into the performance of a corporation’s 
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executives and policies.189 Such assessments would examine a 
corporation’s culture and character, including executive compensation 
policies and other incentive practices, executive turnover, and internal 
controls such as revenue recognition procedures.190 These  factors, 
which are commonly used by D&O liability insurers to decide which 
corporations they will insure,191 are considered to be “at least as 
important as and perhaps more important than other, more readily 
observable governance factors in assessing director liability risk.”192 
These more in-depth and focused assessments should then be 
made public to shareholders and the market regularly, in order to allow 
investors to make more informed investment decisions, and thereby 
create a market valuation of banks that consistently incorporates 
unbiased corporate governance information.193 Investors will not only 
benefit from corporate governance indices through access to reliable 
information, but it will also incentivize banks to maintain strong 
corporate governance systems.194 Emphasizing corporate governance 
policies will increase internal stability and releasing these redesigned 
corporate governance indices will provide banks with an opportunity to 
differentiate themselves from their peers in the market, as well as 
potentially increasing access to credit.195 
Although increasing accountability and responsibility among 
directors and officers is critical, pursuing this objective through director 
and officer personal liability produces negative effects for directors, 
shareholders, and firms. The same goal of executive accountability and 
responsibility can be achieved by focusing instead on corporate 
governance practices and policies implemented by financial institutions 
as well as by allowing access to reliable and in-depth information 
regarding these practices for the firm’s shareholders and general 
investors in the market. 
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